



*Disarmament and  
International Security*  
**GWCIA XIV**  
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**Chair:** Trish Puttmann

**Vice Chair:** Tom Luley  
**Vice Chair:** Lera Tsayukova

Hey Delegates!

We're going to kick this background guide off right with some introductions: my name is Trish Puttmann and I'll be serving as the chair of DISEC this year at GWCIA XIV. I'm a Junior in the Elliott School here at GWU, working for my degree in Conflict & Security. I call Brussels, Belgium home, but since I was a military brat, I had the chance to live else where in the world, including Australia, Germany, Hawaii, and several other states.

Last year at GWCIA, I had the opportunity to serve as Secretary General, but this will be my first time as a chair at this conference and I'm looking forward to meeting you all. I'm very excited about our day together, and I bet we'll have a blast. Disarmament, weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light weight weapons, and other security issues are a huge passion of mine; my goal at this conference is to assist you by facilitating a better understanding of the complexities and consequences these issues have across all our lives and the lives of others living in Central Asia.

I have attended and chaired over 25 conferences since my introduction to MUN in 2004, and I always keep coming back to DISEC. We will be GWCIA's largest committee! Which means we have to be the best! I hope you all meet lots of new friends and always remember the importance of compromise, meaningful solutions, and negotiation. We all have lots to learn and teach each other – I hope each one of you enjoy your time researching our topic and our committee. If you have questions for me about topics or the run of DISEC in general, feel free to shoot me an email at [puttmann.trish@gmail.com](mailto:puttmann.trish@gmail.com). See you in November!

À Bientôt!  
Trish

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Hello Delegates!!!

My name is Tom Luley and I will be your Vice Chair for GWCIA XIII. Before getting into the nitty gritty of our committee and our exciting topic of discussion I just want to provide you with a little background about myself. I am currently a Junior in the Elliot School of International Affairs here at The George Washington University. As part of my studies I have decided to focus on Latin American political and security issues as my area of interest.

With that said the fun now begins. In the pages following is a background guide detailing what exactly our issue is and how it relates to life in Central Asia today. Read the guide thoroughly and research as much about the topic as possible. When you have done your research please write a 1-page paper outlining the position you intend to represent your country with and print out and bring a hard copy with you to committee on the day of the conference. Be prepared for lively debate and tons of fun. If you have any questions do not hesitate to email me at my email at [tomluley@gmail.com](mailto:tomluley@gmail.com).

Cheers,  
Tom Luley

## WELCOME TO DISEC

The First Committee on Disarmament and International Security (DISEC) is a specialized committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The UNGA was founded in 1945 as the primary deliberative body of the UN in which every member state has equal voice and an equally weighted vote. As mentioned before, the UNGA is made up of six committees, the first of which is DISEC. According to the UN Charter, the GA may “consider and make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security, including disarmament.” While the DISEC committee is only authorized to make non-binding recommendations, the actions and decisions that result from deliberations have affected the lives of millions of citizens worldwide.

The topic you will be discussing throughout your time at GWCIA – the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Central Asia – has a huge affects on the lives of individuals across the globe. Ways to curb, or stop, these sales has been a contested issue for decades, yet the solution discovered has the potential to save millions of lives in the war-torn region.



This year, we will not be placing a cap on the number of resolutions that can be passed by this body. The dais will, however, encourage mergers and maintain close monitoring of cooperative work amongst delegates to promote the sharing of ideas for cohesive and comprehensive resolutions. This topic is cross

border and affects both military and civilian populations in mass quantities. Members of the DISEC committee always remember to think of the bigger picture, work together, and always act in a diplomatic manner.

## ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN CENTRAL ASIA



### *Introduction:*

Violence is the fourth most leading cause of death among people ages 15-44. Every year armed violence leads to almost 740,000 deaths per year. Over the past 30 years the nature of armed conflict has changed greatly. There has been an increase in so-called “low-intensity conflicts”, which are more privatized and informal than “traditional” wars. Unlike “traditional” wars, the line between civilian and combatant has grown thin, which is proving deadly. Almost 500,000, 2/3 of the total deaths caused by armed violence, take place outside of war-zones and are a result of these “low-intensity” or “soft” conflicts. In this increasingly violent world, Central and South Asia are the most impacted. Killings outside of war-zones are over four times the world average.

### *Historical Background:*

There has been some historical oddities in US intervention in Afghanistan. In the 1980s the United States was responsible for sending hundreds of millions of dollars to Afghani



forces known as the Mujahadeen, as they struggled against Soviet invaders; now nearly thirty years later, the United States is spending almost as much to buy back those weapons as they spent to originally supply them. This is just one example of how arms trading in the region has affected the region and why there is such a need to fight to stem the flow of weapons into these conflicts.

Illicit arms trafficking of SALW is the most direct cause of violence from terrorism and civil conflict for one simple reason: without weapons people would not have the means to kill. The black market offers groups and individuals the opportunity to obtain just about any type of weapon, big or small. Stemming the flow of weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, is extremely difficult. Small arms and light weapons have legitimate military, law enforcement, and/or recreational uses, unlike weapons of mass destruction. This makes it harder for governments to ban the manufacturing and stockpiling of these than it would be to ban chemical and biological weapons. Instead, governments try to prevent the misuse and mistrade of small arms and light weapons. This, still is not an easy task. The size, concealability, and deadliness of small arms makes them a smuggler's dream and a law enforcement nightmare.

***Current Status:***

The acquisition of small arms is facilitated through the black market. Hundreds of thousands of small arms are obtained by traffickers from poorly protected government arsenals. Then they are smuggled across national borders any possible way – sometimes in mislabeled cargo, under groceries in a car, or even air-dropped from old war planes. Despite the transportation danger, small arms and light weapons remain very inexpensive. For just a few thousand

dollars, someone could purchase a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile and shoot down a commercial airliner. The amount of casualties invoked from just a \$100 assault rifle could number in the upwards of 100.

Small arms trafficking is not an easily solved problem. All you can do is try to manage the problem. Strong export and border control can help to control trafficking. Also, the safeguarding or destroying of stockpiles can reduce the number on the market. Another effective way of managing the problem is by infiltrating and dismantling its networks. On March 7, 2008, progress was made towards dismantling this international network. Russian businessman Viktor Bout, who became known as the Merchant of Death, was arrested as a result of a US sting operation. They lured him into a fictitious \$5 million deal to deliver a cache of guns and surface-to-air missiles to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also known as FARC. Bout was suspected of supplying weapons to fuel conflicts involving the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, the diamond trade in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, and most surprisingly the genocidal regime in Rwanda. His capture is a great step in the right direction but there are many more like him.

Arms salesmen such as Viktor Bout have had an immeasurable impact on the conflict in Afghanistan and elsewhere in South Asia. As centuries long tribal conflicts have been exposed to weapons of greater and greater destruction, the potential for these tribal conflicts to spill over into the rest of the populace has increased at an incredible rate. Bout is well known for his support of the Taliban in helping them to not only procure weapons but find a way of transporting weapons in and drugs and money out.



***Bloc Positions:***

Bloc positions are important for all delegates to understand because they represent the delegations you will likely seek to work with. While bloc positions are by no means absolute, they can offer an idea of where each nation stands on the issue and help you form cooperative working groups. Below follows a list of six voting blocs that have the potential for similar opinions, agendas, and voting patterns. Take these positions with a grain of salt; allow them to help you prepare your state's policy, but there can be exceptions to any. While your nation might not be explicitly mentioned, you can still make inferences and policy initiatives based upon regional dynamics and other nations. The bloc positions are broken down by region or political clout; blocs include: P5, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Asia, Middle East, and Africa.

The P5

"P5" is a term you will often hear in discussions about the UN. P5, of course, is the term that refers to the Permanent Five nations of the Security Council with veto power. The P5 nations are: PR China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The P5 nations' interests are staggered:

- China is a large arms producer in the world, today. China is often accused by the international community for ignoring tedious, expensive, but necessary requirements for tracking newly made weapons because of the concern for profit. China will certainly support viable solutions, but might want to ignore restrictions on production.
- France is in fact the third largest arms producer in the world. She is also a world voice in the rule of Law and host of the INTERPOL headquarters. France

will likely seek very strict requirements of the countries of Central Asia.


- Russia is the second largest arms producer in the world. In the 1980s when the Soviet Union was involved in a war in Afghanistan, the government left behind much weaponry that is still moved and used throughout the nation.
- United Kingdom, while still the fourth largest producer in the world, will likely adopt a policy much like France's. The UK, like the US, is *heavily* invested in Afghanistan. The UK has been hit by the second highest number of casualties in Afghanistan, and will likely financially and diplomatically support urgent methods to curb the deadly, illegal activity.
- United States is, indeed, the largest arms producer in the world, almost doubling that of Russia (second). The US is also suffering the largest number of casualties at the hands of small arms fire in Afghanistan. The US will dedicate herself to the causes to eradicate illegal trafficking, but will be wary of limitations and restrictions on producers.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean have suffered greatly from the illegal trafficking of small arms and lightweight weapons. The Colombian rebel group, FARC, for instance, benefit from the illegal sales and are then able to conduct operations against government forces. The illegal trade has lengthened the time the rebel group has been able to engage government forces. Latin American governments act well together to combat this issue. Countries of this region will likely seek the support and council of neighboring governments. UN-LiREC, or the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin



America and the Caribbean is a fine example of state cooperation, but also underlines its needs for improvement. This region will likely agree on best practice methods to create solutions for Central Asia.



### Asia

The area the DISC committee is focusing is a sub-region of Asia. Asian states such as Pakistan and Afghanistan have a history of finger-pointing for the instability within the region. Governments, of course, will cooperate and support methods and initiatives to combat the illegal trade, but truly lack the infrastructure, financial requirements, and knowledge of how to do so – nations of South and Central Asia will seek help. China was, of course, mentioned in the P5 section.

### Middle East

Stability in the Middle East also suffers greatly from the illegal trafficking of small arms and lightweight weapons. While no states of the regions are credited as big arms producers, insurgent groups are in high number here, functioning on illegally acquired weapons. Like Afghanistan, the Middle East lacks the resources necessary to hit the market hard, and should rely on government stockpile reduction and seek assistance and capacity building initiatives from other able-body nations

### Europe

European Nations, like those of Latin America and the Caribbean, work closely to monitor the movement of small arms and lightweight weapons. Currently 26 European states (members of NATO) are involved in a war in which the enemy's use of illegally acquired weapons is imposing severe casualties on European Soldiers. While there are few notable rebel/insurgent groups active within Europe, EUROPOL, INTERPOL, and state governments are deeply invested in curbing the flow of weapons in Central Asia, namely Afghanistan and Pakistan.




### Africa

Child Soldiering, while a global phenomenon, is largest in Africa. SALW enables rebel groups to arm children in Africa; in fact, most automatic rifles are simple enough a 7 year old could wield one. African state policies will mirror those of the Middle East; she lacks the means to curb the practice, and additionally suffers the greatest from the consequences of the trade.

***Questions to Consider:***

When discussing the topic with your counterparts, keep the following questions in mind. Revisit them and allow your resolution to answer some of these themes.

- *Who is affected by the trafficking of small arms? Who benefits from their sale?*
- *Why might someone want to illegally sell these arms? (Supply)*
- *Who seeks the purchase of these weapons? (Demand)*
- *Why are small arms and lightweight weapons in such high demand?*
- *Consequently, why is the supply market now so big?*
- *Should solutions be implemented at the state, regional, or global level?*



***Possible Solutions:***

The sale of small arms and lightweight weapons worsen and often extend war. Solutions for the illegal sale and transaction of weapons must do three things: (1) prevent the transactions; (2) reduce the market; and (3) criminalize acts of supplying insurgent, or non-state forces. Solutions must be undertaken by both the member states in question, but also by transnational cooperation through organizations such as INTERPOL. How might you accomplish 1, 2, and 3?

To prevent transactions, tracking and tracing systems must be fully adopted by all nations. Transactions often occur across borders, or in many states; for these reasons, states must develop a universal system and make multilateral agreements in good faith with neighboring governments to combat the trade.

To reduce the market, states must destroy stockpiles of weapons within their borders. Stockpiles of old, unused, or surplus weaponry are prime targets for traffickers. States might consider placing stringent restrictions on arms producers, limiting the amounts of weapons entering the market.

Finally, by criminalizing the act of exporting or transferring arms and ammunitions to groups other than the Government forces, themselves, we can expect harsher punishments for perpetrators. This is a method that can target the largest group of interested buyers (Demand).

***Helpful Websites:***

- <http://www.un.org/>
- <http://www.un.org/disarmament/>
- <http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/primer.html>
- [www.un-casa.org](http://www.un-casa.org)
- <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html>

